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 Abstract:
We employ a life-cycle model with income risk to analyze how tax-deferred individual
accounts aect households' savings for retirement. We consider voluntary accounts as
opposed to mandatory accounts with minimum contribution rates. We contrast add-
on accounts with carve-out accounts that partly replace social security contributions.
Quantitative results suggest that making add-on accounts mandatory has adverse welfare
eects across income groups. Carve-out accounts generate welfare gains for high and
middle income earners but welfare losses for low income earners. In the presence of rare
stock market disasters, individual accounts with default portfolio allocation crowd out
direct stockholding and substantially reduce welfare.
Keywords:
Individual retirement accounts, household portfolio choice, consumption and saving over
the life-cycle
JEL-Classication:
E21, H55, G11.Non-technical summary
Tax-deferred individual retirement accounts have become an increasingly important
component of the social security systems worldwide. However, the role that individual
accounts assume with respect to the public retirement system varies substantially across
countries. Voluntary and mandatory add-on accounts supplement the public pension
system while carve-out accounts replace part or all of the unfunded pension system with
funded individual accounts. The current discussion on pension reform in the U.S. centers
around the question which form such plans should take in the public pension system.
Using a life-cycle model calibrated to the U.S., we vary the roles individual retirement
accounts assume in the public social security system and examine the eects on house-
holds' consumption and savings decisions depending on the type of account implemented.
To take account of the investment risks that plan participants face, we also study the
eects of default investment rules in the retirement account and the impact of a stock
market crash on households' retirement savings, their portfolio choice and welfare.
Our results show that if households are required to hold mandatory add-on accounts
with a compulsory minimum contribution rate, they are forced to invest more for re-
tirement in younger years when they would rather consume than save. Crowding out
retirement savings that households would voluntarily undertake at later stages in life gen-
erates welfare losses of between 2 and 3 % of certainty-equivalent consumption across
dierent income groups. On the contrary, carve-out accounts have a positive impact on
welfare for middle and high income earners because of the benets of converting social
security contributions into individually managed accounts with optimally chosen risky
portfolio shares. For the low income group, however, mandatory carve-out accounts gen-
erate welfare losses because low income earners face limited benets from the tax deferral
and do not save suciently to compensate for future income reductions.
The perceived risk of a nancial market downturn aects the optimal portfolio choices
substantially. While in normal times default portfolio rules have limited welfare eects,
they imply higher utility costs in the presence of rare stock market disasters as they
crowd out direct stock market participation. This nding is important given that many
households may not be able to make informed investment decisions. Default investment
rules can be considered as a device to limit the potential welfare costs generated by major
investment mistakes for the nancially less literate.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Steuerlich beg unstigte pers onliche Rentenkonten spielen weltweit eine immer gr oere
Rolle innerhalb der Sozialversicherungssysteme. Allerdings variiert die Bedeutung und
Ausgestaltung, die diesen pers onlichen Konten im jeweiligen staatlichen Altersversor-
gungssystem zukommt, von Land zu Land erheblich. Freiwillige und obligatorische Zu-
satzkonten stellen Erg anzungen zur staatlichen Alterssicherung dar, w ahrend im Fall von
Rentenkonten, die Rentenversicherungsbeitr age abzweigen (sog. \carve-out accounts"),
das nicht kapitalgedeckte Altersversorgungssystem zum Teil oder zur G anze durch kapi-
talgedeckte pers onliche Konten ersetzt wird. Die aktuelle Diskussion zur Rentenreform in
den Vereinigten Staaten kreist um die Frage, wie diese verschiedenen Formen der Alters-
sicherung in das staatliche System eingebracht werden sollen.
Anhand eines auf die USA kalibrierten Lebenszyklusmodells wird die jeweilige Bedeu-
tung pers onlicher Rentenkonten im staatlichen Sozialversicherungssystem variiert, und
es wird untersucht, wie sich unterschiedliche Rentenkontentypen auf die Konsum- und
Sparentscheidungen der privaten Haushalte auswirken. Bei der Ber ucksichtigung der An-
lagerisiken, denen die Beitragszahler bei dieser Form der privaten Altersvorsorge ausge-
setzt sind, wurden auch die Auswirkungen von einfachen, deterministischen Anlageregeln
beleuchtet, und es wurde der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Eekt die Erwartung eines
gravierenden Einbruchs der Aktienpreise (B orsenkrach) auf die Ersparnisse zur Alters-
vorsorge, die Anlageentscheidungen und die Wohlfahrt der privaten Haushalte h atte.
Die Studie zeigt, dass private Haushalte, die ein obligatorisches Zusatzkonto mit ei-
nem vorgeschriebenen Mindestbeitrag unterhalten m ussen, in j ungeren Jahren- und somit
zu einer Zeit, in der ihre Konsumneigung in der Regel h oher ist als ihre Sparneigung-
gezwungen sind, mehr in die Altersversorgung zu investieren als sie optimal w unschen.
Die Verdr angung von Ersparnissen zur Altersvorsorge, welche die privaten Haushalte in
sp ateren Lebensphasen freiwillig t atigen w urden, f uhrt in den verschiedenen Einkommens-
gruppen zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten von 2% bis 3%, gemessen als Gewissheits aquivalent des
Konsums. Im Gegensatz dazu wirken sich \carve-out"-Konten positiv auf die Wohlfahrt
der Bezieher mittlerer und hoher Einkommen aus, da die Umwandlung von Sozialversi-
cherungsbeitr agen in individuell verwaltete Konten mit einer optimalen Verteilung risi-
kohaltiger Portfoliokomponenten Vorteile mit sich bringt. In der einkommensschwachen
Gruppe f uhren obligatorische \carve-out"-Konten allerdings zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten, da
die Betroenen von der Steuerbeg unstigung nur bedingt protieren und keine ausreichend
hohen Ersparnisse anlegen, um k unftige Einkommenseinbuen aufzufangen.
Wenn das Risiko einer Finanzmarktkrise in die Erwartungen der Haushalte mit ein-geht, werden optimale Portfolioentscheidungen durch obligatorische Anlageregeln erheb-
lich beeintr achtigt. W ahrend feste Portfolio-Anlageregeln unter normalen Umst anden be-
grenzte Wohlfahrtseekte haben, implizieren sie, wenn selten auftretende B orsenkr ache
in Betracht gezogen werden, h ohere Einbuen im Nutzen der Haushalte, da sie eine direk-
te Beteiligung am Aktienmarkt verdr angen. Dieses Ergebnis ist angesichts der Tatsache,
dass viele private Haushalte m oglicherweise nicht in der Lage sind, fundierte Anlageent-
scheidungen zu treen, von Bedeutung. Feste Anlageregeln k onnen als ein Instrument
fungieren, mit welchem sich potenzielle Wohlfahrtsverluste, die durch umfangreiche An-
lagefehlentscheidungen seitens in Finanzdingen weniger versierter Personen entstehen,
begrenzen lassen.Contents
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1 Introduction
In many countries tax-deferred individual accounts have become an increasingly important
component of the social security system. Around the world, dierent pension systems
feature dierent types of dened contribution plans. While in the U.S. IRAs or 401(k)
plans are voluntary, other countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Australia recently
introduced individual accounts that require compulsory contributions that co-exist with
the unfunded public pension system. In contrast, in the UK and Japan, households can
decide whether they contribute to the public retirement system or whether they \contract-
out" into approved personal pension plans that fully or partially replace social security
contributions. Since in 2001 the President's Commission suggested to include mandatory
individual accounts in the social security system, there has been an ongoing policy debate
on the role of individual accounts in the U.S. pension system.2 In view of the recent
nancial turmoil, it has become particularly important to understand the inuence of
stock market crashes on households' retirement savings, their portfolio choice, and the
role of individual accounts.3
This paper employs a life-cycle model with exogenous stochastic labor income cal-
ibrated to the U.S. to analyze how dierent types of tax-deferred individual accounts
aect households' consumption, savings and portfolio allocation decisions as well as wel-
fare. We incorporate the risk of losing retirement benets due to a nancial market
downturn and analyze the impact of disaster expectations on optimal retirement savings
in individual accounts.4
1Previous versions of this paper were circulated under the title `Pension Reform and Individual Ac-
counts'. We thank Michael Haliassos, seminar participants at the Deutsche Bundesbank, participants at
the International Netspar Pension Workshop 2011, the Meeting of the Canadian Economic Association
2010 and the Meetings of the European Economic Association 2009 for very useful comments and sug-
gestions. The views expressed by the authors in this paper are their own and do not necessarily reect
those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Julia Le Blanc: Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Center, Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, 60431
Frankfurt am Main, Germany, email: julia.le.blanc@bundesbank.de, phone: +49 69 9566 8626.
Almuth Scholl: University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, Box D 132, 78457 Konstanz, e-mail:
almuth.scholl@uni-konstanz.de, phone: +49 7531 883615.
2See President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009).
3See the papers on retirement plans and the Great Recession in the May 2011 edition of The American
Economic Review.
4In a recent paper, Alan (2011) shows that the perceived risk of a stock market disaster signicantly
reduces stock market participation and stockholding in a life-cycle model. Her model, however, abstracts
1Our life-cycle model of portfolio choice builds on Gomes, Michaelides, and
Polkovnichenko (2009) and Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) and assumes that house-
holds can save in a taxable as well as an illiquid, tax-deferred account. In line with the
literature on limited stock holding, in order to hold risky assets in the taxable account
households need to pay a one-time xed stock market entry fee. In contrast, investing
in stocks is costless in the tax-deferred account. We follow the categorization of Turner
(2006) and consider three dierent types of individual accounts. First, as in Gomes et al.
(2009), households can save voluntarily in the individual account. Second, households are
required to make compulsory minimum contributions to the individual account on top
of their contributions to the public dened-benet retirement system. Third, households
carve out into mandatory individual accounts that replace part of the public social secu-
rity system. In this scenario, households get a rebate on their contributions to the public
pension system but are required to invest that amount in the funded individual account.
Following Alan (2011) we introduce disaster expectations by assuming that households
face a small probability of experiencing a stock market crash in each period when they
update their expectations. We use the estimated disaster probabilities and stock market
drops for the U.S. by Barro and Ursua (2008) and analyze the eects of the perceived
risk of a nancial market downturn on retirement savings considering the dierent types
of individual accounts.
Our quantitative results show that households save in voluntary individual accounts
for two reasons. First, taxation is deferred, i.e., taxes are paid upon withdrawal, and,
second, the retirement account provides costless access to risky assets yielding a risk pre-
mium. On the other hand, retirement accounts are illiquid, and in our model households
cannot withdraw funds until retirement age. In line with Gomes et al. (2009) and Pries
(2007) our simulation results show that early in life households save little in the illiquid
account but from age 35 the contributions to the individual account start to rise such
that retirement wealth follows a hump shape over the life cycle. The perceived risk of
a nancial market downturn aects optimal savings and portfolio choices substantially:
households strongly reduce their stock market exposure in the taxable, liquid account and
reduce their contributions to the illiquid individual account.
If households are required to hold mandatory add-on accounts with a compulsory
minimum contribution rate, they are forced to invest more for retirement in younger
years when they would rather consume than save. Crowding out retirement savings that
households would voluntarily undertake at later stages in life generates welfare losses of
from tax-deferred individual accounts.
2between 2 and 3 % of certainty-equivalent consumption across dierent income groups.
Comparing add-on and carve-out accounts reveals that the latter generate higher savings
in the individual account as well as in the liquid taxable account due to the positive income
eect of the rebate on the social security contributions. In retirement, when households
have lower income from the public pension system, they use their private retirement wealth
to compensate for the loss. Our analysis suggests that carve-out accounts have a positive
impact on welfare for middle and high income earners because of the benets of converting
social security contributions into individually managed accounts with optimally chosen
risky portfolio shares. For the low income group, however, mandatory carve-out accounts
generate welfare losses because low income earners face limited benets from the tax
deferral and do not save suciently to compensate for future income reductions.
The worldwide trend toward dened contribution plans for retirement has raised con-
cerns about the quality of the investment decisions of plan participants. In individual
accounts, households may be subject to investment mistakes such as insucient diver-
sication, excessive trading or holding too much or too little risk.5 In this context, in
addition to default enrollment6 and contribution rate schedules,7 plans with default port-
folio allocation rules have been put forward, see, e.g., Bodie and Treussard (2007), Viceira
(2007), and Porterba, Rau, Venti, and Wise (2010). We employ our calibrated life-cycle
model to assess the quantitative impact of individual accounts with default portfolio al-
location rules on consumption and wealth and verify the resulting utility costs. Clearly,
default investment rules generate welfare losses as they impose a constraint on the optimal
behavior of households. The question at hand is how harmful such a constraint is. As long
as the welfare loss stemming from the non-optimality of default funds is lower than the
welfare loss stemming from investment mistakes, policymakers may nd it worthwhile to
consider portfolio rules. Our quantitative results suggest that while default portfolio rules
have hardly any eect on households' wealth accumulation in the absence of the proba-
bility of a stock market crash, they strongly aect households' investment choices when
we allow for disaster expectations. In a world with rare stock market disasters, default
portfolio rules crowd out direct stockholding and generate welfare losses of approximately
5Survey-based evidence on households' nancial capabilities shows that a consistent fraction of the
population lacks basic nancial knowledge. Studies that focus on the quality of the investment decisions
are, e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007),
Turner (2006), Thaler and Bernartzi (2004), Bernartzi and Thaler (2001) and Agnew, Balduzzi, and
Sunden (2003).
6See, e.g., Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009), Bernartzi and Thaler (2007), Choi,
Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2004), Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2002) and Madrian and
Shea (2001) who propose automatic enrollment policies with an option to opt-out.
7See, e.g., Thaler and Bernartzi (2004) and Pries (2007).
31:5 % of certainty-equivalent consumption since households have to take more risk in their
individual accounts than they optimally desire.
Our paper contributes to the literature by analyzing pension reforms and optimal
individual behavior in a realistically calibrated life-cycle model of portfolio choice with
exogenous stochastic labor income. We build on Gomes et al. (2009), Dammon et al.
(2004), Amromin (2003) and Love (2007) who study the tax-ecient asset location and
allocation decisions with taxable and tax-deferred accounts. In these papers, the eects of
dierent types of individual accounts are not taken into account. Our paper is also related
to Campbell, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2001) who analyze the eects of alternative
retirement systems on consumption, wealth accumulation and portfolio choice in a partial
equilibrium model. However, they do not explicitly model tax-deferred savings accounts.
Pries (2007) introduces dierent personal retirement accounts in a life-cycle model but
focuses mainly on labor supply distortions over the lifetime. These papers all abstract
from the risk of losing retirement savings due to a nancial market downturn.
A large part of the social security reform literature has focused on the potential general
equilibrium impact of various reform proposals and the costs and benets associated with
the transition toward a funded system. Examples of this literature include Auerbach and
Kotliko (1987), Kotliko (1998), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), De Nardi, Imrohoroglu,
and Sargent (1999) and Menil, Murtin, and Sheshinski (2006). Given their emphasis on
general equilibrium phenomena, these papers often make simplifying assumptions about
the actual decision problems that individuals face, in particular with respect to stock-
holding decisions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses individual retirement accounts
in dierent countries. In section 3 we present the life-cycle model of optimal portfo-
lio choice with dierent types of tax-deferred individual accounts. Section 4 describes
the calibration of the model and presents the quantitative ndings. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Individual Accounts Around the World
There is a common trend in public pension systems around the world: the number of de-
ned benet plans is declining while dened contribution plans have become increasingly
important. Individual accounts take a number of forms in dierent retirement systems.
Turner (2006) and Kritzer (2005) note that the choice depends on the country's cultural,
economic and demographic background. Voluntary dened contribution plans have grown
in importance in many high-income countries and can be found in, e.g., Canada, the UK,
4the U.S. as well as in Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries.
Mandatory accounts were introduced by countries which had to fundamentally reform
their pension structures and are now found in some Latin American countries but also
in the reformed pension systems of Sweden, Denmark and Australia. Turner (2006) cat-
egorizes individual accounts according to their relationship to social security: they can
be add-on accounts or carve-out accounts from social security. An add-on account sup-
plements the social security benet and leaves social security contributions unaected. A
carve-out account replaces part or all of the social security benet with benets coming
from the carve-out account. Table 1 is taken from Turner (2006) and gives an overview
over the variety of types of individual accounts in public pension systems of dierent
countries.
In the U.S. there is an ongoing policy discussion on the role of individual accounts
in the pension system, see Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009), Turner (2006) and Kritzer
(2005). Turner (2006) argues that the reformed social security systems of Sweden, the
UK and Chile are the most likely ones to inuence the design of a pension reform in the
U.S. In 1999 Sweden reformed its dened-benet social security system by introducing
mandatory supplemental individual accounts. Out of the total contribution rate of 18.5%
to the new pension system, 2.5% are diverted to individual accounts, the \Premium
Pension". Swedish participants have a choice of more than 460 dierent funds to choose
from with a default fund run by the government (Sunden (2006)). As early as 1980, Chile
reformed its pay-as-you-go dened-benet system by replacing it with privately managed
individual accounts (full carve-out). Participants contribute 10% of their pre-tax salary
and may also make voluntary contributions to a private pension fund of their choice.
Contributions are tax-deductible so that the government subsidizes pensions. There are
dierent funds participants can choose from with a default fund that invests according
to the participant's age. Since 1986 the UK's pension system has included carve-out
accounts that allow participants to voluntarily substitute a part of social security with
an individual account. Employees can contract-out of the public dened-benet plan into
an Approved Personal Pension based on individual accounts. Participants of carve-out
individual accounts receive a rebate on their social security contributions, which is paid
directly into the carve-out account.
In the following, we develop a life-cycle model with exogenous stochastic labor income
calibrated to the U.S. considering three dierent types of individual accounts.8 First,
8This is by no means a complete description of individual accounts that can have many additional
features in reality. For an extended overview of the types of dierent individual retirement accounts in
the social security systems of dierent countries see Turner (2006).
5we consider the status quo of the U.S. and suppose that households can save voluntarily
in the tax-deferred account. Second, we consider mandatory add-on accounts as they
are implemented in Sweden. Third, as in the UK, households carve-out into mandatory
individual accounts that partially replace the public social security system.
3 The Life-Cycle Model
We build on Gomes et al. (2009) and analyze the quantitative properties of a life-cycle
portfolio choice model with exogenous stochastic labor income that features a taxable
(TA) as well as an illiquid, tax-deferred (TDA) individual account.9
Households live for a maximum of T periods and face an exogenous conditional survival














where Ct is consumption and  denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion. 0 <  < 1
is the discount factor. pj denotes the probability of being alive at age j, conditional on
j   1.
During working life, labor income is given by:
Yt = PtUt;
Pt = exp(f(t;Zt))Pt 1Nt;
where f(t;Zt) is a deterministic function of age t and household characteristics Zt. Pt
denotes the permanent component of labor income. The logs of the transitory and per-
manent shocks, lnUt and lnNt, are independent and identically normally distributed with
means  :52
U and  :52
N and variances 2
U and 2
N, respectively. Retirement takes place
exogenously at age K. Retirement income is characterized by a constant fraction of
the last income Yt = PK where  represents the replacement rate. In addition, during
retirement households withdraw wealth from their tax-deferred account.
The investment opportunity set consists of two assets: households can invest in a
riskless asset (bond) and in a risky asset (stock) in both the TA as well as in the illiquid
9In our model, we make the simplifying assumption that the TDA is completely illiquid during working
life and households gain access to their retirement savings only as they retire. In reality, retirement
accounts are de facto illiquid as withdrawals are subject to penalties and individuals gain access to TDAs
as they reach a pre-specied age which does not have to coincide exactly with their entry into retirement.
See Holden, Ireland, Leonard-Chambers, and Bogdan (2005) for details on the rules of TDAs in the U.S.









t and rb are the returns on the risky and the safe asset, respectively. s is the mean
risk premium and s
t is independent and identically normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance 2
. Households pay taxes on returns in the taxable account, and ~ rs denotes the
after-tax return on the risky asset while ~ rb is the after-tax return on the safe asset.
Households save in the illiquid TDA because investment in the TDA is exempt from
labor income taxes and retirement assets are accumulated at pre-tax rates of return. In
addition, stock market participation is costless in the TDA, while in the TA households
have to pay xed stock market entry costs that are, e.g., associated with the transaction
cost of opening a brokerage account. As argued in section 2, we consider dierent types
of TDAs and categorize them by their relationship to social security: they can take the
form of an add-on or a carve-out account. Carve-out accounts reduce contributions to and
benets from social security, while add-on accounts do not aect the income received from
the public pension system but require additional contributions. Moreover, we distinguish
individual accounts by their degree of compulsion, i.e., whether participation in individual
retirement accounts is voluntary or mandatory.
3.1 Add-On Tax-Deferred Accounts
As a benchmark scenario we consider voluntary add-on accounts as analyzed by Gomes
et al. (2009). We assume that households can contribute a fraction of their income to the
unfunded social security system and, in addition, save for retirement in the TDA. In both
accounts, the household may invest in a riskless as well as in a risky asset. Let r
t and 
t
denote the share invested in risky assets in the retirement account and taxable account,





t(1 + ~ r
s
t+1) + (1   

t)(1 + ~ r
b)](W

t   Ct   ktYt(1   d)   ItFtPt)
+(1   d   s)Yt+1 (1)
with the borrowing constraint W 
t+1  0 and the short-sell constraint 
t 2 [0;1]. d and
s represent the labor income and social security tax, respectively. ~ rs
t+1 and ~ rb are the
after-tax returns on the risky and the safe asset, respectively. kt 2 [0;0:2] denotes the
endogenous contribution rate to the individual retirement account that is exempt from
labor income tax. Ft denotes the xed entry cost as a share of the permanent component
of labor income. It is an indicator function that equals 1 if the xed entry cost is paid for
7the rst time and zero otherwise. Households who have not yet paid the xed cost can
only invest in the riskless asset in their TA. In this case, 
t = 0.
In the TDA, savings accumulate tax-free. During working life, wealth accumulation












t + ktYt) (2)
with the borrowing constraint W r
t+1  0 and the short-sell constraint r
t 2 [0;1]. rs
t+1
and rb are untaxed returns as opposed to the after-tax returns ~ rs
t+1 and ~ rb imposed in the
TA.10
In retirement, both constraints change to take account of the fact that households
receive income from the withdrawals Qt of the TDA that are taxed with the labor income
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denoting the minimum withdrawal rate from the TDA during retirement, which is equal
to the inverse of households' life expectancy At.11
We contrast voluntary add-on accounts with mandatory add-on accounts that require
households to make minimum contributions to the TDA on top of their contributions to
the public pension system. In this variation of the model, households face the additional
constraint kt  kmin during working life.
3.2 Carve-Out Tax-Deferred Accounts
In contrast to add-on accounts, carve-out accounts replace a part of the public pension
system with individual accounts: households get a rebate on their social security contri-
butions but are required to invest that amount in the TDA. The carve-out works like a
10In our model, there is no employer-matching, i.e., households only benet from the tax-deferral
of their own savings. Employer-matching, of course, makes saving in the TDA more benecial as the
employer matches the contribution of households one to one up to a certain cap.
11This matches the minimum distribution requirements of DC pension plans in the U.S.
8\loan" from social security: the worker borrows from future social security benets to
invest in an individual tax-deferred retirement account. Workers repay the loan through
receipt of reduced social security benets (Turner (2006)). To take account of the reduc-
tion of future benets, we calculate the accumulation of carved-out contributions, kc, in a
\hypothetical account" (HA) assuming an interest rate on the hypothetical balance equal
to the risk-free rate.12 These contributions are calculated from the permanent income of
the household in time t. Upon retirement, the HA balance resulting from the crediting
of contributions and interest is converted into a hypothetical annuity, based on life ex-
pectancy at that time. Social security benets are reduced by this hypothetical annuity.
In carve-out accounts, employees benet from the higher returns that they receive over
the return to their contributions that social security would give them.
During working life, the hypothetical wealth accumulation evolves according to:
W
h





kc > 0 denotes the constant and exogenous carved-out contribution rate from social secu-
rity. Accordingly, retirement income is reduced by
Wh
t
At where At denotes the household's
life expectancy at age t.
We consider mandatory carve-out accounts that require compulsory carve-out con-
tributions to the individual retirement accounts. Accordingly, during working life, the
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with kt  kc, meaning that households have the opportunity to voluntarily save on top
of the carved-out contributions. Since households divert part of their social security
contributions kc to the individual retirement account, the social security contributions
are reduced to 
s = s   kc.


















12The trade-o between contributions to an individual carve-out account and the reduction in the
future payout of social security is one of the most important aspects in the design of a carve-out account
as it directly aects the generosity of the carve-out account for participants and the related costs to
the government. The debate about the \right" interest rate for the benet oset is also reected by
the report of the President's Commission (President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001))
which includes three dierent possible rates. An interest rate in the hypothetical account below the risk
free rate implies that the individual account is subsidized by the social security system. An interest rate
equal to the bond rate means there is no subsidy, which is what we assume here.
9During working life and retirement, wealth accumulation in the TDA is described by
equations (2) and (4), respectively.
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration
To assess the quantitative properties of our life-cycle model we calibrate the model to
the U.S. economy. Table 2 summarizes the parameter values for the benchmark model.
We employ the estimated gross income proles by Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotliko (2005)
that are based on pre-tax non-nancial income. Working life starts at age 20, retirement
takes place exogenously at age 65, and the replacement rate is set to 60% which is in line
with the empirical evidence for the U.S. (see Gomes et al. (2009)). Figure 1 displays the
estimated income prole for three dierent income groups. The solid line is the middle
income group which is used in the benchmark calibration. We set the variances of the
permanent and temporary shocks to labor income to 10% which is in line with Carroll
(1997).
We follow the household nance literature and set the parameter of relative risk aver-
sion  = 4 and the discount rate  = 0:96. We assume a labor income tax equal to 25%
which corresponds to the empirical average income tax of the middle income group. In
the taxable account, the return on bonds is taxed at a rate equal to the labor income tax.
In line with the U.S. tax system, the return on bonds is taxed higher than the return on
stocks which we calibrate to 22:5%. Social security contributions for the dened-benet
system of the U.S. are at 6.5% and this is the rate at which we set the social security
payroll tax in the model.13
The real bond return is set to 2 % and the mean equity premium equals 4% with a
standard deviation of 20%. The correlation between stock returns and permanent labor
income shocks is 0:15. There is no correlation between stock returns and the transitory
labor income shocks. These parameter values are standard in the literature, see, e.g.,
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).
The size of the xed stock market entry cost has been debated. While some authors
nd that it is negligible, others argue that it is necessary to match stockholding over the
life cycle, see, e.g., Alan (2006) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). We follow Gomes et al.
(2009) and set the one-time xed cost to 5% of permanent income.
13We assume that all employees pay 6.5% of their gross wages as contributions, irrespective of their
income, i.e. there is no upper limit on the wages subject to the social security contributions, such as the
Social Security Wage Base.
10We follow Alan (2011) and introduce disaster expectations by assuming that house-
holds face a small probability of experiencing a stock market disaster in each period when
they update their expectations. If a disaster strikes, a large portion of the household's
stock market wealth evaporates and households face a negative return of . We use the
estimated disaster probabilities and stock market drops for the U.S. by Barro and Ursua
(2008). The probability of a disaster for the U.S. is assumed to be 4.03% and the negative
return in the case of a disaster is on average 27:8%.14
4.2 Voluntary Add-On Accounts
As a benchmark, we assume that households can voluntarily invest in tax-deferred indi-
vidual accounts in addition to the social security contributions. We simulate the life-cycle
patterns of consumption, savings in the liquid account, contributions to the individual
account, the risky shares and the resulting cash on hand variables for 10,000 households.
We calculate the mean contribution rates to the individual account, the mean risky shares
as well as median wealth-to-earnings ratios in the taxable and the tax-deferred account
across households and across age groups. To analyze the impact of the perceived risk
of a nancial downturn, the solid lines in gure 2 present the life-cycle patterns for the
benchmark model without disaster expectations, while the solid lines in gure 3 refer to
the model that incorporates the probability of a stock market crash.
If households save voluntarily in the tax-deferred individual account, wealth accumu-
lation in the TDA and TA features a hump shape over the life cycle. Young households
have a high expected future income against which they cannot borrow and they prefer
to consume most of their income and save modestly for precautionary reasons. As labor
income increases and the income prole becomes less steep, from about 30-35 years of
age, the contribution rate kt to the individual account starts to increase, and wealth ac-
cumulation in the retirement account rises fast due to the tax-deferral of returns. During
the last years before retirement, agents save on average 5% of their annual gross income
in their individual account. This is in line with the ndings of Gomes et al. (2009).
Since young households are liquidity constrained, their marginal utility of consumption
is high. As a result, they do not participate directly in the stock market until they have
14In principle, one can think of many implications that disasters might have in our model. For example,
they might have eects on social security income YK, wage income Yt and the bond return rb. Our
focus is on the risky portfolio location and allocation decisions in the TA and the TDA. We therefore
abstract from any other inuence of macroeconomic disasters and isolate the eects that a drop in the
stock return has on portfolio choice and tax-ecient behavior. Introducing such additional features of
a recession would, however, be easy to implement. In our model, any further uncertainty driven by a
recession would lead to additional background risk and higher bond holdings.
11accumulated sucient wealth. This happens quickly in the rst few years after which they
pay the xed entry cost. The direct participation rate in the stock market reaches 100%
by the age of 30. Conditional on stock market participation, young households allocate
almost all of their assets to stocks in the TA. This is due to the fact that young households
are overinvested in human capital and view this non-tradable asset as an implicit riskless
asset in their portfolio. As households grow older and their permanent income decreases,
they reduce their exposure to stocks and start investing in bonds.15 Since households do
not need to pay a xed entry cost to hold stocks in the TDA, they invest almost fully in
stocks early in life. As investors grow older, however, they increasingly shift their TDA
portfolios towards bonds, the higher-taxed security, to optimize tax-allocation of their
assets. During retirement, future labor income and nancial wealth in both accounts are
falling. The potential number of years that households receive public pension income -
a close substitute for risk-free asset holdings - decreases. This induces investors to hold
more stocks in both accounts as the end of life approaches.16
Figure 3 shows that introducing a small probability of a nancial market downturn
aects the optimal portfolio choices substantially. During working life, households are
subject to risky labor income and - in addition - face the risk of a stock market crash.
Households save a large fraction of their TA wealth in stocks only at the beginning of
their lives and reduce their stock market exposure quickly as they age. The decrease in
the risky portfolio share is modest in the TDA as the eect of the stock market risk will
only aect households after retirement when they have certain labor income. However,
the increased stock market risk reduces savings in the illiquid individual account.
4.3 Mandatory Add-On Accounts
In this section we assume that households are required to save a compulsory contribution
rate to an individual account in addition to the social security contributions. We choose
a minimum xed contribution rate of 3% of income over the entire working life which is
comparable to the mandatory add-on rate in Sweden and other countries. Households can
still save more in a tax-deferred account voluntarily. The dashed lines in gures 2 and
3 refer to the life-cycle patterns for the model without and with disaster expectations,
respectively.
Comparing wealth-to-income ratios over the life cycle with those of the voluntary add-
15See e.g. Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) for the substitutability between bonds and human
capital.
16This is due to the absence of a bequest motive in the model. Introducing bequests would lower shares
towards the end of life.
12on case reveals that households who have to save for retirement in a mandatory account at
young ages consequently save less of their resources in the liquid, taxable account which
drives the wealth-to-income ratios down. Compared to the benchmark model with volun-
tary add-on accounts, the introduction of minimum xed contribution rates leads to higher
median wealth-to-income ratios in the TDA during all ages. Voluntary contributions to
the TDA above the mandatory contributions at later ages are \crowded-out". While
households with a voluntary add-on account make very small contributions in younger
ages and increase their retirement savings from age 35 onwards, households with manda-
tory add-on accounts have to invest 3% of their annual gross labor income for retirement
from the beginning of their working lives when they would rather consume and save less
in the tax-deferred account during the prime years of retirement saving.
While portfolio choices in the liquid account are hardly aected by the mandatory
contributions to the individual account, households shift their TDA portfolios towards
the safer asset. Households invest a substantial share in risky assets in the TDA only at
older ages. The higher wealth-income ratios in the TDA and the optimal tax-allocation
of assets induce households to invest their retirement savings in bonds. This eect is
particularly strong if households face the additional risk of a stock market disaster, see
gure 3.
To evaluate the welfare consequences of mandatory add-on accounts, we facilitate a
comparison with voluntary accounts by calculating the constant consumption stream that
makes the household as well-o in terms of expected utility.17 Table 4 displays the welfare
losses calculated in terms of percentage deviations in certainty-equivalent consumption
relative to the voluntary add-on scenario if there is no disaster probability. Households
living in the mandatory-add-on world suer losses equal to 2:3 % of certainty-equivalent
consumption, reecting the adverse eects of compulsory savings for retirement in young
years when they would prefer to consume more.
Table 5 shows that the presence of rare stock market disasters decreases the welfare
loss generated by a mandatory add-on account. This is due to the tax-ecient behavior
that characterizes optimizing households. In the presence of a disaster probability, house-
holds face increased background risk. Consequently, if individual accounts are voluntary,
households reduce their contributions to the retirement account and shift their savings
to the liquid account. If, however, individual accounts are mandatory, households cannot
reduce their contributions and, instead, limit their risk exposure in the TDA by shifting
their tax-deferred savings into bonds. As bond returns are taxed higher than stock re-
17Details are provided in the appendix.
13turns, agents with mandatory add-on accounts choose a more tax-ecient allocation if
they face the additional risk of losing retirement savings due to a stock market crash.
4.4 Mandatory Carve-Out Accounts
The mandatory carve-out accounts have two eects. First, they increase households' net
income by giving them a rebate on their social security contributions, and, second, house-
holds have to invest the carved-out amount in the tax-deferred account. In retirement,
their income from the unfunded public system is reduced by the annuitized amount to
which their carve-out saving rate would have accumulated if invested at the risk-free rate.
The dotted lines in gures 2 and 3 show the life-cycle patterns associated with manda-
tory carve-out accounts without and with the additional risk of a nancial market down-
turn, respectively. A comparison of the carve-out and the add-on scenarios reveals that
the mandatory carve-out account generates higher savings in both the individual account
as well as the liquid taxable account until agents are in retirement. This is due to the tax
savings they encounter: households benet from a positive income eect because of the
reduced social security contributions. This results in higher consumption levels during
working life compared to the voluntary add-on scenario. When households retire, they
have accumulated more wealth in the individual account compared to the other two sce-
narios. Their higher private retirement wealth compensates for the loss in public pension
benets.18
Our welfare analysis in table 4 suggests that carve-out accounts have a positive impact
on the welfare of middle income earners because of the benets of converting social security
contributions into individually managed tax-deferred accounts with optimally chosen risky
portfolio shares. It turns out that households experience a welfare gain of 0:87 % of
certainty-equivalent consumption relative to the voluntary add-on scenario. These gains
are even larger if agents live in a world with disaster expectations, see table 5.
4.5 Default Portfolio Rules
The worldwide trend toward individual accounts in which investment decisions are made
by the plan participants themselves has raised concerns about the quality of the investment
decisions. Many authors have pointed out the lack of nancial sophistication that results
in low participation rates, inertia in portfolio choices and limited diversication, see,
e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Turner (2006), Thaler and
18After deducting their carved-out contributions from the public pension benets, their replacement
rate amounts to 37% instead of 60% of their last working life income.
14Bernartzi (2004), Bernartzi and Thaler (2001) and Calvet et al. (2007). In a large panel on
401(k) participants, Agnew et al. (2003) nd that most asset allocations by TDA members
are extreme (either 0 or 100 percent in equities) and that there is substantial inertia in
asset allocations. Since investment mistakes may imply considerable welfare costs, default
portfolio allocation rules (also known as life-cycle funds) have been put forward in the
context of DC pension plans, see, e.g., Bodie and Treussard (2007), Viceira (2007), and
Porterba et al. (2010). Such default portfolio allocations are typically inversely related to
the participants' age, although other types of default funds exist.19
In our model, default investment rules generate welfare losses as they impose a con-
straint on the optimal behavior of households. The objective of this section is to ana-
lyze how harmful such a constraint is. As long as the welfare loss stemming from the
non-optimality of default funds is lower than the welfare loss stemming from investment
mistakes, policymakers may nd it worthwhile to consider portfolio rules. Gomes, Kot-
liko, and Viceira (2008) calculate the welfare costs of employing dierent types of default
investment rules in a model with exible labor supply. They show that a typical life-cycle
fund generates minimal deviations in consumption and wealth accumulation when com-
pared to the optimal choices so that welfare losses are moderate. In the following, we
pursue a similar analysis to evaluate the welfare costs of default rules in dierent types
of individual accounts emphasizing the role of disaster expectations.
We study the eects of an age-dependent default portfolio allocation rule on house-
holds' savings decisions considering voluntary and mandatory add-on accounts as well as
mandatory carve-out plans. The default rule xes the risky share in the TDA, thereby
exogenously mimicking a life-cycle fund where the risky share is falling as the participant
gets older, r
t = (100   age)%. Figures 4 and 5 show the life-cycle patterns associated
with default rules in individual accounts without and with the additional risk of a nancial
market downturn, respectively.
If households do not face the risk of a nancial market downturn, life-cycle patterns
dier only slightly compared to the case of the optimally chosen risky shares. Only when
they are old do agents hold higher risky shares in the TA as the default risky share
is very low in the TDA. As a result, as table 4 shows, default portfolio rules generate
rather modest welfare losses of approximately 0:20 % of certainty-equivalent consumption
relative to the scenario of a voluntary add-on account with endogenous portfolio choice.
These ndings support the notion that it is benecial to introduce default rules if the
quality of investment decisions is low.
19See Viceira (2007) and the references in Bodie, McLeavey, and Siegel (2007).
15While default portfolio rules have hardly any eect on households' wealth accumulation
and portfolio choice for the liquid account in the absence of the probability of a stock
market crash, they aect households' investment choice strongly and generate substantial
welfare losses when we allow for disaster expectations. Figure 5 displays life-cycle proles
for households in the case of a default rule in the TDA in the presence of a small probability
of a stock market disaster. Households that are forced to save in stocks through an age-
dependent investment rule face an increased stock market risk in their retirement savings.
The only way to reduce the exposure to stock market risk is to hold no stocks in the liquid
account anymore. This is the case for the voluntary and mandatory add-on scenarios
as well as the carve-out account. Households shift their liquid savings exclusively to
bonds during their working years. Only during retirement, when they do not face labor
risk anymore, they start investing in stocks in the liquid account. Overall, the eect
is stronger for the case of a mandatory than for a voluntary individual account where
households can still adjust their contribution rates downwards. These results support the
empirical nding of limited direct stock market participation.
The welfare analysis in table 5 reveals that the combined scenario of default rules
and disaster probabilities generates substantial welfare losses compared to the voluntary
add-on account without the default rule. Households suer welfare losses of 3.6% of
certainty-equivalent consumption if they have to save in a mandatory add-on account.
Even mandatory carve-out accounts generate welfare losses of 0:52 %. Thus, the negative
eects of the high stock market risk dominate and make voluntary add-on accounts more
attractive than mandatory carve-out accounts.
4.6 Dierent Income Groups
In many countries, the introduction of tax-deferred retirement plans is motivated by the
envisaged advantages that low and middle income earners gain from such public policy.
For example, low income earners are often less nancially literate, and oering retirement
savings plans may enable these households to benet from the equity premium through
low-cost participation in the stock market. Existing default rules can have additional
positive eects as less nancially educated households might be particularly prone to
investment mistakes in terms of non-participation and under-diversication. We therefore
solve and simulate our model for the optimal behavior of high and low income groups that
can be identied with our income prole.20
20In our calibration, low, middle and high income groups only dier by their income levels and the
diverse tax rates paid on these. Realistically calibrated income shocks should be dierent for dierent
education groups, see, e.g., Cocco et al. (2005). Including dierent transitory and permanent shocks
16In accordance with the tax brackets of the U.S. and other countries, higher income
earners pay higher taxes compared to lower income groups. Table 3 displays the average
tax rates that are paid by the high and low income groups as they are observed in the
U.S. in 2001. Figure 5 shows the life-cycle patterns of the TDA contribution rates and of
consumption (normalized by permanent income) for the dierent income groups. Table 4
shows the associated welfare eects arising from access to the dierent types of TDAs in
the absence of rare stock market disasters.
Households in the highest income group have the strongest incentive to participate in
the TDA as they benet the most from the tax deferral. As a result, they start saving early
for retirement and their contribution rates to the TDA increase quickly. In comparison
to the voluntary add-on account, carve-out accounts generate substantial welfare gains of
around 2 % for the high income earners. Mandatory add-on accounts still generate welfare
losses, however, the adverse welfare eects are reduced in comparison to the middle income
group. The same results hold if we account for disaster expectations, see table 5. These
results underline the observation from micro data that mostly high income earners with
higher income tax rates have the largest incentives to save in TDAs.
Households in the lowest income group pay a low tax rate on their gross income.
As they benet less from the tax-deferral of individual accounts, they encounter the
highest welfare losses when saving for retirement is mandatory. Relative to voluntary
add-on accounts, mandatory carve-out accounts imply utility costs for the low income
earners while they generate utility gains for the middle and high income groups. To
gain an intuition for this result, recall that during working life households holding a
mandatory carve-out account get a rebate on their social security contributions while
during retirement their income from the public pension is reduced. Since households
invest a share r
t of their retirement savings in risky assets at the return rs, whereas the
hypothetical account accumulates at the lower safe return rb, the loss in income from the
public pension is at least compensated by the privately accumulated assets. Figure 5 shows
that across all income groups, households save exactly kt = kc in the carve-out account,
i.e., they do not make higher contributions to the TDA than they have to until they are
close to retirement. In contrast, if households invest in voluntary add-on accounts, they
increase their contribution rates over the life-cycle. At the same time, during working life,
would leave our results qualitatively unchanged. There would be slight quantitative dierences: including
higher transitory and permanent shocks for low-income households would lead to higher uncertainty and
therefore a more prudent portfolio choice and lower consumption, while a higher permanent shock for
the high income group would make the high income group only slightly worse o in comparison to our
results. Abstracting from dierent shocks allows us to focus on the tax incentives of the dierent income
groups.
17households with a carve-out account benet from a positive income eect and consume
more than households with an add-on account. Thus, part of the additional income
during working life is consumed instead of saved as households discount the future. By
the time of retirement, households decumulate their TDA wealth quickly as income from
the public pension system is reduced. As a result, consumption normalized by permanent
income is lower during retirement if households hold a carve-out account instead of an
add-on account. The welfare analysis shown in tables 4 and 5 reveals that for the middle
and high income groups the positive eects coming from the rebate on social security
contributions as well as from the tax-deferral and risk premium dominate. Low income
earners, however, suer a utility cost of up to 0:50 % as they face a high marginal utility
of consumption during working life and do not save suciently to compensate for future
income reductions. Protecting low income households from saving too little would either
require a higher mandatory contribution rate or lower interest rates on the hypothetical
account for the benet oset.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed life-cycle saving, wealth accumulation and portfolio allo-
cation decisions in a model with a taxable account and a funded, tax-deferred individual
account in the presence of uninsurable labor income risk and borrowing constraints. We
have varied the roles individual retirement accounts assume in the public social security
system and have examined the eects on households' life-cycle decisions depending on the
type of account implemented. In addition, we have analyzed the impact of a perceived
risk of a nancial market downturn on optimal retirement savings in individual accounts.
Our results are limited by the experimental nature of our model exercises, however,
we have gained some useful insights into the incentives that TDAs pose to participating
households. Our results conrm the hypothesis that forcing agents to save a minimum
fraction of their income crowds out retirement savings they would voluntarily undertake
at later stages in life, generating welfare losses of 2 to 3 % measured in certainty-equivalent
consumption. Mandatory carve-out accounts, on the contrary, have positive welfare ef-
fects for the middle and high income groups because of the benets of converting social
security contributions into individually managed TDAs with optimally chosen risky port-
folio shares. For the low income group, however, mandatory carve-out accounts generate
welfare losses as low income earners benet less from the tax deferral and do not save
suciently to compensate for future income reductions.
Our quantitative analysis has shown that the perceived risk of a nancial market
18downturn aects the optimal portfolio choices substantially. While in normal times default
portfolio rules have limited welfare eects, they imply higher utility costs in the presence
of rare stock market disasters as they crowd out direct stock market participation. This
nding is important given that many households may not be able to make informed
investment decisions. Default investment rules can be considered as a device to limit the
potential welfare costs generated by major investment mistakes for the nancially less
literate.
In our model, households that live in a world where nancial crises can occur are
limited in their optimizing behavior as they can only reshue their risky portfolio share
to a safer investment option and adjust the level of their savings, both liquid and illiquid.
In reality, households have more options to ensure themselves against the devastating
eects of a nancial disaster: they can decide to work longer years and increase their
retirement benets. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2011) and McFall (2011) provide recent
evidence that TDA participants are responding to the sharp downturn of stock prices
during the Great Recession by prolonging their working years. We leave the important
question of savings in individual accounts and labor supply decisions in times of a stock
market crash to future research.
Our paper has focused on the eects of individual accounts on households' savings
and portfolio allocation decisions only. The introduction of dierent types of tax-deferred
accounts, however, has general equilibrium eects on the entire economy as tax revenues
are inuenced. In addition, introducing carve-out accounts decreases the value of social
security contributions and has potentially severe scal consequences during the transition
period from an unfunded system to a system which is partially funded. Therefore, it is of
particular interest for future research to analyze the general equilibrium eects of dierent
types of individual accounts along the transition paths.
19Appendix
A Numerical Algorithm
Our numerical algorithm follows Gomes et al. (2009). To reduce the number of state
variables we normalize all variables by the permanent income component, Pt, and denote
















































subject to the normalized constraints (1), (2), (3), (4), depending on age and type of the
individual account.
To solve the model, we start from the last period and proceed backwards. At any
point in the state space we nd the optimal choices by using grid search. We apply tensor
product splines to interpolate for points that do not lie on the grid. Numerical integrations
are performed using Gaussian quadrature. To take account of the higher curvature of the
value function we follow Gomes et al. (2009) and use a grid with more points allocated
to lower levels of wealth. To decide whether to pay the xed stock market entry costs at
time t the household compares the two value functions associated with direct stock market
participation It = 1 and no direct access to stock markets It = 0. We take the maximum
of the two value functions and derive the policy functions for the current period. Using
these policy functions, we update this period's value function and proceed with solving
the previous period's maximization problem. We iterate until t = 1.
B Utility Cost Calculation
To evaluate the welfare implications of dierent types of individual accounts, we calculate
the utility costs of mandatory add-on and carve-out accounts relative to the benchmark
scenario which we assume to be the voluntary add-on account with endogenous r. For
each scenario, we calculate the constant consumption stream that makes the household
20as well-o in terms of expected utility. Utility costs are calculated in terms of percentage
deviations in certainty-equivalent consumption relative to the benchmark scenario.
Following Cocco et al. (2005), we compute expected lifetime utility for each model sce-

















From this expression we calculate the equivalent constant consumption stream C that
makes the agent indierent between this constant consumption and the consumption
























As an example, consider the welfare eects of mandatory add-on accounts. The utility
cost in percentage-deviation in certainty-equivalent consumption is given by:
Loss
mandatory =
 Cvoluntary    Cmandatory
 Cmandatory :
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25Table 1: Individual Retirement Accounts Around the World
Type of Plan Country Name of Plan Contribution Rate in %
Mandatory Add-on, Sweden Premium Pension 2.5
funded Denmark ATP 1.5
Switzerland BVG/LPP (Employer-provided) 7.0-8.0
Australia Superannuation Guarantee 9.0
charge (Employer-provided)
Mandatory Add-on, Sweden Notional Account 16.5
unfunded Italy Notional Account 33.0
France ARRCO / AGIRC 14.0
Mandatory Carve-out, Chile Administradoras de Fondos 10.0
funded de Pensiones
Voluntary Add-on, United States Individual Retirement 4000$
funded Account, 401(k) 18 max
Canada Registered Pension Plan 18.0 max
United Kingdom Personal Pensions 17.5 max
Germany Riester Pension 4.0
Voluntary Carve-out, United Kingdom Approved Personal Pension 4.6
funded Colombia
Source: Turner (2006), page 12.
26Table 2: Model Parameters for the Benchmark
Preferences  Risk aversion 4
 Discount rate 0.96
Labor income U Transitory shock 0.10
process N Persistent shock 0.10
 Replacement rate 0.60
Asset returns rb Real bond return 0.02
s Equity premium 0.04
s Standard deviation 0.20
Corr(t;lnNt) Corr(stock returns,
permanent labor inc shocks) 0.15
Corr(t;lnUt) Corr(stock returns,
transitory labor inc shocks) 0
F Fixed cost of stock
market participation 0.05
Mandatory Minimum xed
Add-on kmin contribution rate 0.03
Mandatory Mandatory
Carve-out kc carve-out rate 0.03
Stock market p Annual disaster 0.0403
disaster probability
 Stock market 0.278
drop
Table 3: Tax Treatment of Dierent Income Groups
High income group d Labor income tax 35%
b Tax on bond returns 25%
g Tax on stock returns 22.5%
s Social security tax 6.5%
Middle income group d Labor income tax 25%
(Benchmark) b Tax on bond returns 25%
g Tax on stock returns 22.5%
s Social security tax 6.5%
Low income group d Labor income tax 10%
b Tax on bond returns 25%
g Tax on stock returns 22.5%
s Social security tax 6.5%
27Figure 1: Gross Labor Income Proles
Notes: The upper dashed line refers to gross, non-capital labor income for the high income group
(college graduates) whereas the lower dashed line is the income prole of the low income group
(less than high school). The solid line represents the middle income group and is the basis for
the benchmark calibration. Proles and parameters are taken from Fehr et al. (2005).







(e) kt (f) Stock market participation rate
Notes: We simulate the life-cycle patterns for 10,000 households of the middle income group. The
solid line refers to life-cycle patterns associated with voluntary add-on accounts, while the dashed and
dotted lines correspond to life-cycle patterns associated with mandatory add-on and mandatory carve-out
accounts, respectively. Panels (a) to (f) display the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TA wt
t, the
median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TDA wr
t, the mean conditional risky share in the TA t
t, the mean
conditional risky share in the TDA r
t, the mean contribution rate to the TDA kt and the stock market
participation rate.







(e) kt (f) Stock market participation rate
Notes: This gure assumes disaster expectations as specied in table 2. We simulate the life-cycle
patterns for 10,000 households of the middle income group. The solid line refers to life-cycle patterns
associated with voluntary add-on accounts, while the dashed and dotted lines correspond to life-cycle
patterns associated with mandatory add-on and mandatory carve-out accounts, respectively. Panels (a)
to (f) display the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TA wt
t, the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in
the TDA wr
t, the mean conditional risky share in the TA t
t, the mean conditional risky share in the
TDA r
t, the mean contribution rate to the TDA kt and the stock market participation rate.







(e) kt (f) Stock market participation rate
Notes: This gure assumes a default investment rule and exogenously xes the portfolio choice r =
(100   age)=100. We simulate the life-cycle patterns for 10,000 households of the middle income group.
The solid line refers to life-cycle patterns associated with voluntary add-on accounts, while the dashed
and dotted lines correspond to life-cycle patterns associated with mandatory add-on and mandatory
carve-out accounts, respectively. Panels (a) to (f) display the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TA
wt
t, the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TDA wr
t, the mean conditional risky share in the TA t
t,
the mean conditional risky share in the TDA r
t, the mean contribution rate to the TDA kt and the stock
market participation rate.







(e) kt (f) Stock market participation rate
Notes: This gure assumes disaster expectations as specied in table 2 and exogenously xes the portfolio
choice r = (100   age)=100. We simulate the life-cycle patterns for 10,000 households of the middle
income group. The solid line refers to life-cycle patterns associated with voluntary add-on accounts,
while the dashed and dotted lines correspond to life-cycle patterns associated with mandatory add-on
and mandatory carve-out accounts, respectively. Panels (a) to (f) display the median wealth-to-earnings
ratio in the TA wt
t, the median wealth-to-earnings ratio in the TDA wr
t, the mean conditional risky share
in the TA t
t, the mean conditional risky share in the TDA r
t, the mean contribution rate to the TDA































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 4: Utility Costs
Endogenous r Exogenous r
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory
Add-on Carve-out Add-on Add-on Carve-out
Middle income group 2.31 -0.87 0.20 2.39 -0.68
High income group 2.06 -2.04 0.20 2.13 -1.98
Low income group 2.78 0.50 0.15 2.83 0.52
Notes: This table evaluates the welfare consequences of dierent types of individual accounts
across income groups. The middle income group is the benchmark calibration. Welfare losses
and gains of mandatory add-on and carve-out accounts are given relative to the voluntary add-on
account with endogenous r. For each scenario, we calculate the constant consumption stream
that makes the household as well-o in terms of expected utility. Utility costs are calculated
as percentage deviations in certainty-equivalent consumption relative to the voluntary add-on
account with endogenous r.
Table 5: Utility Costs with Disaster Expectations
Endogenous r Exogenous r
Mandatory Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Mandatory
Add-on Carve-out Add-on Add-on Carve-out
Middle income group 2.17 -1.02 1.48 3.62 0.52
High income group 1.76 -2.34 1.36 3.25 -0.88
Low income group 2.48 0.16 1.11 3.66 1.27
Notes: This table considers disaster expectations and evaluates the welfare consequences of
dierent types of individual accounts across income groups. The middle income group is the
benchmark calibration. Welfare losses and gains of mandatory add-on and carve-out accounts
are given relative to the voluntary add-on account with endogenous r. For each scenario, we
calculate the constant consumption stream that makes the household as well-o in terms of
expected utility. Utility costs are calculated as percentage deviations in certainty-equivalent
consumption relative to the voluntary add-on account with endogenous r.
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